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EXEMPTION OF INSURANCE AND OTHER
PROPERTY IN THE VIRGINIAS AND CAROLINAS
E. MCGRUDER FARis, JR.*
Current state statutes on the exemption of debtors' property from
execution processes are for the most part needlessly unrealistic. While
it is true that some jurisdictions have in recent years recodified their
exemption laws to meet the needs of an inflationary and mechanized
economy, others have been content to roll along with exemptions de-
signed in part for the horse and buggy days.
That the law of exemptions has lagged behind economic develop-
ment is clearly illustrated by the provision of the North Carolina
Constitution of 1868 which permits a homestead exemption not ex-
ceeding $i,ooo. South Carolina and West Virginia provide the same.
These provisions obviously offer the debtor only a small fraction of
the protection to which he was originally entitled. Even attempts
at modernizing our exemption laws have often been rather feeble.
For example, while Virginia in 1956 did recognize the advent of the
motor vehicle by giving farmers an exemption of "one tractor, not
exceeding in value five hundred dollars," the legislature apparently
assumes that "one yoke of oxen" and a cart will supply other trans-
portation essential for farm operation.
Although the above illustrations indicate that certain exemptions
have decreased relatively with the passage of time, there are other
exemption statutes which show an undue solicitude for the debtor at
the expense of his creditor. A leading offender in this respect is the
exemption of various types of insurance benefits. Because the exemp-
tion of insurance is not necessarily related to the needs of the debtor
and his dependents, special attention will be given to the subject. A
few suggestions for change will be offered.
Before proceeding to examine insurance exemptions in particu-
lar, it seems appropriate to outline present day exemption laws in
general. This will enable the reader to see the insurance exemptions
as parts of a whole, somewhat haphazard, statutory scheme. An ex-
amination of these laws may leave one with the impression that they,
like Topsy, just sort of growed. Attention is particuarly directed to
state constitutional provisions dealing with the exemption of per-
*Assocate Professor of Law, Wake Forest.
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sonal property. If the wording of a constitutional provision seems
to place a maximum on the amount of personal property which can
be claimed as exempt, there is reason to question the constitutional-
ity of a mere statute expanding the size of exemptions.
In the outline below the miscellaneous exemptions are grouped
according to jurisdictions.1 While this makes the process of compari-
son somewhat more difficult, the average reader will probably be
more interested in the laws of a given jurisdiction than in the man-
ner in which they compare with those in other states.2 For those
interested in the comparative aspect of exemption laws, the process
of comparison may be somewhat simplified by the references given.
Following the outline, a few general comparative comments will be
made.
I. OUTLINE OF EXEMPTION LAWS
North Carolina
Homestead: "[A] homestead.., not exceeding in value one thou-
sand dollars .... '-3 Protection is limited to residents and generally
can be claimed only in real property and not the proceeds thereof.4
Personal Property: "The personal property of any resident of
this state, to the value of five hundred dollars ....
Tools of Trade: Prior to the adoption of the above provision on
personal property in the Constitution of 1868, North Carolina did
enumerate certain articles (including farming and mechanical tools,
libraries of licensed attorneys, and instruments of surgeons and dent-
ists) that were exempt from debtor's execution.6 There was no
monetary limit on the quantity of such tools of trade or profession
'The exemption laws considered here have been limited to those of North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia. For a comparison with
other jurisdictions see Joslin, Exemption Laws: Time For Modernization, 34 Ind.
L.J. 355 (1959).
21t seems appropriate here to insert a word of warning. Although the lists of
exemptions in the outline are relatively complete, some exemptions may have
been omitted. By way of explanation it should be pointed out that not all "exemp-
tions" are indexed under that heading. Some are under the heading "execution."
Others can be found only under the name of the particular item believed to be
the subject matter of an exemption. Finally, some exemptions exist by case law
alone and often are not fully indexed.
$N.C. Const. art. X, § 2 (1868). See also N.C. Gen. Stats. §§ 1-373, -386 (1953).
N.C. Gen. Stats. § 1-369 and annotations. Cf. note 63 infra. For a comprehen-
sive discussion see Aycock, Homestead Exemption in North Carolina, 29 N.C.L.
Rev. 143 (1950).
5N.C. Const. art. X, § i (x868). See also N.C. Gen. Stats. § 1-396 (1953)-
6McIntosh, North Carolina Practice and Procedure § 2ox (2d ed. 1956).
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which could be held exempt. Since 1868, tools of trade or profession
can be claimed only under the personal property exemption.
Wages: Wages already earned by the debtor are generally available
to meet the claims of his creditor; however, there is a special exemp-
tion of wages earned within sixty days of the date of attempted exe-
cution, provided the debtor can show that such prior wages are
necessary for the use of a family supported wholly by the labor of the
debtor.7
As to future wages of the debtor, it has been held:
"[O]ur statutes concerning proceedings supplemental to ex-
emption were adopted from New York, where it has been
steadfastly held under the original statutes that 'future earnings,
wages, or salaries to become due, or which become due after
service of the order of examination cannot be reached by sup-
plementary proceedings.' "8
Fraternal Benefit Society Benefits: No right or benefit from any
society for the relief of employees, including railroad and other re-
lief associations, shall be liable to any process to subject such benefit
to the debts of any member or any other person who may have any
right thereunder, either before or after payment.9
Workmen's Compensation Benefits: All compensation awarded
under the laws of North Carolina is exempt from claims of creditors
and from taxes,10 but a compensation award by another state is not
exempt in North Carolina. Even North Carolina awards lose their
exempt status upon being converted into other property, and this
includes the depositing of the money in a bank, even though there
is no commingling with other funds."
Retirement and Relief Payments: Among the several special re-
tirement and relief funds, the proceeds of which are exempt, are
Firemen's Relief Fund, 2 Law Enforcement Officer's Relief Fund,'3
City and County Retirement Systems,14 and Old Age Assistance. 15
Farmers' Special Exemptions: No statute giving special exemp-
7N.C. Gen. Stats. § 1-362 (1953).
8Motor Finance Co. v. Putnam, 229 N.C. 555, 50 S.E.2d 67o, 671 (1948).
9N.C. Gen. Stats. § 58-283 (195o).
'Id. at § 97-21.
"aMerchants Bank v. Weaver, 213 N.C. 767, 197 S.E. 551 (1938). Compare West
Virginia's position on bank deposits, note 62 infra.
"N.C. Gen. Stats. § 118-36 (1958).
"Id. at § 143-166.
uid. at § 128-31.
=Id. at § 108-32.
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tions to farmers was found; however, execution may not be levied on
growing crops until they are matured.1
Life Insurance: Proceeds of life insurance without monetary limit
pass to named beneficiaries free of claims of the insured's creditors.
This will be discussed in more detail later.
Group Insurance: As amended in 1957, the statute on exemption of
group insurance benefits makes proceeds of group life insurance which
are payable to the estate of the insured a part of his estate for the
payment of his debts. Apart from this limited availability of life in-
surance, all rights of any person in any type of group insurance are
free from the claims of the creditors of any party with an interest un-
der the policy.IT
-Spendthrifh Trusts: North Carolina allows by statute a very lim-
ited spendthrift trust. Such a trust is free from the claims of the
cestui's creditors to the extent that the corpus does not yield in ex-
cess of a net $5oo per year at the time the trust is created.' 8 Only
trusts created for the benefit of relatives of the grantor qualify for the
spendthrift exemption. These limitations have been criticized by Mr.
Gilbert T. Stephenson.O
South Carolina
Homestead: "[T]o the head of any family residing in this state,
a homestead in lands ... to value of one thousand dollars ....
Personal Property: "[T]o the head of every family residing in this
state... personal property to the value of five hundred dollars." 2 '
Tools of Trade: "[A]ny person not the head of a family shall be
entitled to like exemption as provided for the head of a family in all
necessary wearing apparel and tools and implements of trade, not ex-
ceeding in value the sum of three hundred dollars."
22
Wages: The statutory exemption of wages is identical to that of
North Carlina shown above. Compensation earned within sixty days
preceding an order of execution against such back wages is exempt
from execution if the debtor shows such compensation to be necessary
"1d. at § 1-315(4).
"Id. at § 58-213.
"Id. at § 41-9.
"Stephenson, The North Carolina Spendthrift Trust Statute, Vs N.C.L. Rev.
175 (1952).
OS.C. Const. art. 3, § 28 (1895). See also S.C. Code § 34-1 et seq. (1952).
OS.C. Const. art. 3, § 28 (1895). See also S.C. Code § 34-41 (1952).
=Ibid.
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to support a dependent family.2 3 As to the availability of process
against future earnings, no statutory or case authority was found. In
the absence of a provision permitting garnishment or other process
against a certain part of future earnings, it may be assumed that
South Carolina will probably follow the case law of North Carolina,
which makes it virtually impossible for a creditor to reach his debtor's
future earnings.
2 4
Fraternal Benefit Society Benefits: No benefit of any person before
or after payment shall be subject to any process for the debt of any
person having rights under the policy.
25
Workmen's Compensation Benefits: All compensation awarded
by South Carolina "shall be exempt from all claims of creditors."20
State Retirement System: All rights and receipts of a state em-
ployee under the South Carolina Retirement System are exempt from
any process. 2
Firemen's Pension Fund: Rights in this fund are fully exempt. 28
Life Insurance: Life insurance payable to a married woman, her
children, or children of the insured husband to the extent of $25,000
passes to such named beneficiaries free of the claims of the decedent's
creditors.2 9 This provision will be considered in more detail later.
Spendthrift Trust Exemptions: While the case law of South Caro-
lina does to some extent recognize the validity of a spendthrift trust,
there is no statutory regulation of the subject,30 except a provision
passed in 1953 governing a spendthrift trust in life insurance pro-
ceeds.3 l
Virginia
Homestead: "Every householder or head of family shall be en-
titled ... in addition to articles now exempt.., to hold exempt ... his
real or personal property... to the value of not exceeding two thou-
sand dollars .... ,2
Personal Property: Virginia makes no special provision for the
'S.C. Code § 10-1731 (1952).
2 See note 8 supra.
-S.C. Code § 37-917 (1952)-
'1id. at § 72-187.
2Id. at § 6s-ii6.
-Id. at § 61-407.
!Id. at § 37-169.
Griswold, Spendthrift Trusts § 218 0947).
31S.C. Code § 37-169.1 (Supp. 1958).
Va. Const. § 190 (1902) (Emphasis added.). See also Va. Code Ann. §§ 34-1
to -33 (1950)-
196o]
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exemption of a specific amount of personal property as distinguished
from real property. Rather, as shown above, the homestead exemp-
tion is worded so as to apply to both realty and personalty. The above
provision, however, does imply that there are other exemptions of
personal property made available by statute. Among the items of
personal property specifically exempt by statute at the adoption of the
Constitution of 19o2 were one pot, one spinning wheel, and all squir-
rels not raised for sale.83 This policy of exempting particular articles
of personal property is continued today, and the debtor's squirrels
are still secure from a creditor's talons.
Tools of Trade: Among the numerous enumerated items exempt
from execution in Virginia are tools of trade of a mechanic not exceed-
ing the value of $200.1 4 Prior to the 1956 amendment, the amount was
limited to $oo.
Wages: Of the four states considered, Virginia has the most com-
prehensive statutory scheme for exempting part of the wages of a
debtor. The statute specifically applies the exemption to both past
and future wages. A distinction between a householder and a non-
householder is made, with the householder receiving the greater ex-
emption. For the householder the exemption is 75 per cent of wages,
and under the 1954 amendments the minimum amount exempt is
$ioo, and the maximum $15o per month. By the 1958 amendments
both the minimum and the maximum were increased $15 for each
dependent child of the householder. For the nonhouseholder the
exemption is limited to 50 per cent of the exemption granted to a
laboring man who is a householder.8 5
Farmers' Special Exemptions: Farmers are recognized as a specially
protected debtor class, and certain enumerated articles used for agri-
culture are specifically exempt. As previously stated, the 1956 amend-
ment finally recognized the advent of the motor vehicle by exempting
one tractor not exceeding the value of $500.86 One further agricultural
exemption is found in the statutory provisions on methods of exe-
cution, where it is provided that growing crops are generally not
subject to levy.3 7
Workmen's Compensation: All claims and compensation from
claims are exempt from the levy of all creditors.38
"Va. Code Ann. §§ 34-26, -27 (Supp. 1958).
uId. at § 34-26.
3Id. at § 34.29.
'Id. at § 34-27.
w1 d. at § 8-421.1.
3id. at § 65-79.
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Unemployment Compensation: Such benefits are exempt from
claims for debt so long as the benefits are not mingled with other
funds of the recipient. The exception to this general exemption is
that claims arising for necessaries supplied during the period of unem-
ployment may be realized out of the unemployment benefits.3 9 Is there
merit to this exception from the general exemption?
Group Life Insurance: Both the policy and proceeds of group life
insurance are fully exempt from the debts of the insured and the debts
of any other person. The proceeds are exempt both before and after
payment; and if payable to the estate of the insured rather than to a
named beneficiary, the proceeds do not constitute part of his estate for
payment of his debts.4 0 It is difficult to envision a more complete ex-
emption. Actual needs of the debtor or the beneficiary seem completely
irrelevant to the claiming of this exemption. Perhaps the exemption
does aid the sale of insurance, however.
Other Special Insurance: Payments in .weekly or monthly install-
ments to the holder of an Industrial Sick Benefit Insurance Policy are
exempt from debt claims against the policyholder.4 For benefits under
a Fraternal Benefit Society Policy the exemption is expanded be-
yond protection to the insured debtor. For such a policy it is pro-
vided that no benefit of the insured or any other person shall be sub-
ject to any process before or after payment to satisfy the debt of any
insured or any other person.4 2 Benefits of any person under a policy
of life insurance issued by a Co-operative Non-Profit Life Benefit Com-
pany are granted a broad immunity from execution similar to that
granted to benefits under a policy issued by a Fraternal Benefit So-
ciety.4 3 Again we see that it is the character of the insurer rather than
the character of the debtor that determines whether a particular asset
is subject to the claims of the debtor's creditors. Burial Society bene-
fits are likewise given broad immunity from claims of creditors of
any person with a right to such benefits.
44
Life Insurance: The extent to which various rights under an or-
dinary policy of life insurance are exempt from the claims of the vari-
ous parties with rights under a life insurance policy will be considered
in more detail later. Suffice it to say here that regardless of what par-
UId. at § 6o-io8.
'OId. at § 38.1-482. Compare the 1957 North Carolina amendment, note 17 supra.
"'Va. Code Ann. § 38.1-488 (1950).
tId. at § 38.i-6oi.
3Id. at § 38.1-51o.
"Id. at 38.1-563.
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ties are entitled to protection, there is a limit on the amount of
life insurance that will be exempt from the claims of creditors dur-
ing the life of the insured.45
Retirement Benefits: Benefits received from the Virginia Supple-
mental Retirement System are not subject to any legal process.4 6
Spendthrift Trusts: From 1918 until 1958 Virginia recognized the
spendthrift trust to the extent of $ioo,ooo of corpus, and the income
therefrom was not available to satisfy liabilities of the beneficiary.
In 1958 the monetary amount of the exemption was increased to
$200,000.
4 7
There are also special exemption provisions for spendthrift trusts
created under life insurance policies.48 The ordinary spendthrift
trust statute and that dealing with a life insurance spendthrift pro-
vision have been correlated. The total exemption of the two types
of trusts shall not exceed the $200,000 maximum permitted by the
basic spendthrift provision. A beneficiary is given an election as to




Homestead: "Any husband or parent residing in this state... may
hold a homestead of the value of one thousand dollars....- 0
Personal Property: "[P]ersonal property to the value of two hun-
dred dollars ... subject to such regulations as may be prescribed."5'
Tools of Trade: "Any mechanic.., whether he be a husband or
parent... may hold working tools ... to the value of fifty dollars ...
provided that in no case shall the exemption (personal property) al-
lowed one person exceed two hundred dollars."
52
Wages: Wages due or to become due within one year can be
reached by a "suggestee execution" against the debtor's employer, but
only to the extent of 2o per cent of the wages. Also, a minimum
of $io per week is completely unreachable by the creditor in a pro-
ceeding against the employer. As to wages in excess of $io weekly mini-
mum, or in excess of the 2o per cent available under the "suggestee
5Id. at §§ 38.1-448 to -451.
"Id. at § 51-111.15.
"id. at § 55-19.
"Id. at 38.1-444 to -447.
OId. at § 38.a-446.
50W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 48 (1872). See also W. Va. Code Ann. § 3911 (1955).
"W. Va. Const. art. VI, § 48 (1872). See also W. Va. Code Ann. § 3897 (1955).
"V. Va. Code Ann. § 3897 (1955).
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execution," the debtor may still claim his $200 personal property
exemption. This $200 exemption may be asserted anew each pay
period.
5 3
Group Life Insurance: The policy and proceeds of group life in-
surance, before and after payment, are not subject to claims of creditors
of any person having a right under the policy.
54
Fraternal Benefit Society Benefits: No process can reach any right
of any person in any benefit of a fraternal benefit society, whether the
right arises before or after payment.55
Judges' Retirement Fund Benefits: Judges' rights from this fund
are exempt from any process.56
State Teachers' Retirement: All benefits under the State Teachers'
Retirement System are beyond reach of any process.5 7
Life Insurance: Generally, the proceeds and avails of life insurance
policies payable to persons other than the named insured are free
from the claims of creditors of the named insured.5 8 The application of
this provision will be considered later.
Spendthrift Trusts: The West Virginia statute on spendthrift
trusts is modelled upon the Virginia provision; however, the $200,000
limitation on the trust corpus is omitted.59 Thus, there is no statutory
limit on the amount of property that may be placed beyond the
reach of the beneficiary's creditors by means of a trust with spend-
thrift provisions.
Welfare Benefits: Payments under general relief are not subject
to any process. 60
Workmen's Compensation Benefits: These benefits are free from
the claims of creditors of either the worker or other beneficiary both
before and after payment, except that counsel fees claimed in con-
nection with the award may be enforced against the award.6 1 It has
'W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 3834(3), (9), (16), (25) ('955). Under these provisions
it appears that if the debtor was receiving $ooo per weekly pay period, 20%,
or $200, could be reached under "suggestee execution," unless the debtor chose to
renew his $200 personal exemption in this amount each week.
"Id- at § 3398(28).
IId. at § 3472(269).
tId. at § 526o(14).
-"Id. at § 1846(30).
-W. Va. Code Ann. § 3397 (Supp. 1959), revising W. Va. Code Ann. § 3359
(1955)-
z'V. Va. Code Ann. § 3538 (1955); See also 44 W. Va. L.Q. 48 (1937).
11W. Va. Code Ann. § 626(io3a) (1955).
61d. at § 2543.
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been held that compensation benefits retain their exempt character
even after their deposit in a bank account, so long as there is no com-
mingling with other funds.
0 2
II. COMPARISON OF EXEMPTION LAWS
As previously mentioned, the above outlines of exemption laws
have been grouped according to the individual states so that the reader
can see in one place most of the exemptions for a given jurisdiction.
It seems appropriate, however, to make some general comparisons of
the various exemptions.
Homestead
In all four states there are both constitutional and statutory pro-
visions on the matter of homestead. In no case do the present statutes
on homestead attempt to expand the constitutional limitations. Only
Virginia expressly makes the homestead exemption applicable to per-
sonal property. While homestead is basically limited to land in the
other states, there are cases permitting the claiming of the exemption
in the proceeds of land when it is not feasible to lay off the homestead
in realty proper.63 In all states the exemption is limited to the head of
a household who is a resident. The monetary limits, not exceeding
$2,ooo in any state, give only a fraction of the protection originally
granted. By way of contrast, California grants a homestead of $12,500.64
Personal Property
While North Carolina, South Carolina, and West Virginia ex-
empt a specified dollar amount of personal property, Virginia pro-
vides for the exemption of particular items of personalty. In all four
states there are constitutional provisions on the exemption of personal
property. Whether these constitutional provisions limit the power of
the legislature to create new exemptions will be considered later.
Wages
While all four states have some statutory provision on the exemp-
tion of wages, there is a wide variety in the scope of the exemption.
North and South Carolina have similar provisions exempting wages
earned within the sixty-day period preceding the date of execution.
"Billingslea v. Tartell, 127 W. Va. 750, 35 S.E.2d 89, 94 (1945).
G"Leak v. Gay, 1o7 N.C. 468, 12 S.E. 312 (1890).
O'Cal. Civ. Code § 126o (Supp. 1959), as amended 1953.
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There are no provisions for the exemption of future wages in these
states. North Carolina, however, does take the position that future
wages are unavailable to creditors, not for the reason that there is an
express exemption of such wages, but simply because this is the type
of asset that does not render itself the subject matter of an execution
type of process. By way of contrast, Virginia and West Virginia by
statute do recognize that future wages are the subject of process and
provide limited protection to the wage-earning debtor. The Virginia
statute is the more comprehensive- and provides both a minimum
and a maximum amount to be left to the debtor. West Virginia pro-
vides for a minimum wage exemption, but places no dollar maximum
on the 8o per cent of a given wage claim that is secured to the debtor.
Retirement and Relief Payments
Each of the four states has some provision exempting payments
received under certain retirement or relief plans. The broad exemp-
tion of such payments seems to give an unwarranted immunity. Surely,
even relief payments should be available to creditors who are sup-
plying the needs of the relief or retired debtor. Virginia recognizes
this to some extent when it provides that unemployment payments
are available to those creditors who supply necessaries during the
period of unemployment.
Special Insurance Exemptions
Rights under Fraternal Benefit Society insurance plans are exempt
in all four states. Only South Carolina does not have a special exemp-
tion for rights under group insurance policies. The wording of these
special insurance exemptions is extremely broad; it seems to grant
the particular payment itself an exempt status regardless of to whom
the payment is made.It is submitted that it would be better to measure
the exemption by the need of the debtor rather than to immunize
the asset simply because it is payable by a particular type of insurance
organization or payable under a particular type of policy.
III. EXCEPTIONS FROM EXEMPTIONS
While many assets are exempt against creditors in general, certain
claims are treated as superior to the debtor's exemption rights. By
statute and by case law we find penetrations being made into the debt-
or's exemption haven. It is interesting to note that the older exemption
laws usually specify the types of claims which are superior to the
30 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW .[Vol. XVII
exemption, while the more recent exemption acts are almost uni-
formly silent on the matter. To illustrate the older approach, Vir-
ginia provides that the homestead exemption shall not extend to:
claims for the purchase price of the property being proceeded against,
claims of a laboring person for services rendered, claims of a public
officer for fees due him, claims for rent, or claims for taxes. 05 North
Carolina specifically makes taxes and claims for purchase price su-
perior to the homestead exemption,06 and this express exception has
been extended by case law to the personal property exemption.6 7
When a statute provides for an exemption from "debt," some
courts have seen fit to give a restricted meaning to that term. For
example, it has been held that the obligation of a husband to support
his wife is more than a mere "debt" and is superior to homestead and
personal property exemptions. 08 On the other hand, a judgment based
on a tort claim has been held to be a "debt" and thus subject to the
claim of exemption.6 9 While there is scant judicial construction of the
term "debt" as used in the more recent exemption laws, earlier de-
cisions on the type of claims considered to be "debts" under the older
exemption laws can be useful in defeating exemptions when a superior
right to assets is alleged. This restricting of an exemption so as not to
have it available against certain obligations of the debtor will be made
more difficult when facing a statute omitting the word "debt" in
the creation of the exemption,7 0 or a statute using the phrase "debt
or liability."
7'
IV. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE AND ExECUTION PROCESSES
Before proceeding to examine the history and present status of the
insurance exemption in the Virginias and Carolinas, it is fitting to
inquire into the general nature of the insurance contract. While vague
definitions used in the solution of particular problems in true insurance
WVa. Const. § 190 (1902). For similar South Carolina exceptions see S.C. Code
§ 34-62 (1952).
"N.C. Const. art. X, § 2 (1868).
87City of Wilmington v. James Sprunt & Sons, 114 N.C. 310, 19 S.E. 348 (1894).
°SAnderson v. Anderson, 183 N.C. 139, 11o S.E. 863 (1922).
6ODellinger v. Tweed, 66 N.C. 206 (1872).
"W. Va. Code Ann. § 626(1o3a ) (1955) omits the word "debt" and provides:
"General relief payments received under the provisions of this article shall
be exempted from the collection of taxes (except sales), from levy of exe-
cution, garnishment, and any other legal process." Could a wife demand
support from these payments?
"N.C. Gen. Stats. § 58-283 exempts rights under Fraternal Benefit Policies
from any process "to pay any debt or liability ... " (Emphasis added.)
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litigation will not necessarily aid an understanding of the exemption
problem, still certain basic pr'inciples are firmly established and
should be remembered. In its simplest form, insurance is no more
than a contract whereby the insurer, in exchange for a premium,
promises to compensate another for loss realized upon the happening
of the event insured against. In the field of property insurance
compensation is basically by way of indemnification for actual loss
suffered. Since the event insured against may never occur, the insurer
is often not called on to perform its part of the aleatory contract.
By way of contrast, a contract of life insurance is not one of indem-
nity for actual pecuniary loss. It is in reality an executory contract
calling for the payment of a fixed sum upon the happening of a
condition precedent, the death of the insured. This event is certain
to happen, although the exact time is unknown. In the typical sit-
uation the insurer pays back only the money that has been given to
it to hold in quasi-trust for the insured. It is only in the case of pre-
mature death that the payment at death embraces an element of
indemnity.
7 2
In considering the contract of life insurance, it is emphasized that
although the paramount contractual provisions pertain to the pay-
ment of a stated sum upon the death of the insured, yet there are
other contractual rights and privileges of significance and of mone-
tary value. Among the more common rights paid for, and usually
retained by the insured, are the following: (i) right to borrow
money from the insurer, with the policy to be used as security for the
loan; (2) right to surrender the policy for a sum of money (cash
surrender value); (3) right to change beneficiaries; (4) right to re-
instate the policy after its lapse due to nonpayment of premium;
(5) right to receive paid up or extended insurance in the event of
default in premium payment.
All of these rights have a monetary value in the sense that the
insured is willing to pay to receive them. Likewise, they have a
monetary value in the sense that third persons would be willing to
buy one or more of these rights in an open market. Whether there is
an open market depends on whether the insured is free to sell them;
this in turn depends on the terms of the insurance contract and the
policy of the law regarding the assignment of insurance choses in
action. One restriction in the law of property insurance is the require-
ment that the assignee must have an insurable interest in the property
covered by the policy. This insurable interest requirement is not
'Vance, Insurance § 15 (3d ed. 195).
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so strictly adhered to in the assignment of life insurance; normally
an insured may assign a policy on his own life to any person whom
he chooses.
At this point we may summarize. An insurance policy is simply a
contract, and one usually creating several rights. Some of these rights
belong primarily to the named beneficiary; others belong primarily
to the insured. Any of these will have a monetary value provided
there is no contractual or legal obstacle to assigning them. Under
the general law of debtor and creditor today and apart from ex-
emption statutes, a judgment creditor may proceed against nearly
every assignable or saleable asset of his debtor. This general rule is
limited when the asset sought is of a somewhat contingent nature.
'Examples of such unavailable, though valuable, assets are expectan-
cies of prospective heirs and interests in tenancies by entirety.
With these basic principles in mind, and apart from exemption
statutes, are a debtor's rights as beneficiary or insured available to his
creditors? We find that there is a basis for holding, even without re-
liance on an exemption law, that some rights under a life insurance
policy are not available to creditors. First, an insurance policy as a
chose in action was not subject to levy and sale by execution at com-
mon law. Further, even under statutes which do permit some type
of post-judgment process against choses in action, there are numerous
cases holding that a policy of life insurance is not liable to seizure by
any legal process so long as the insurer's duty to pay is subject to a con-
tingency or a condition precedent.
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V. CURRENT LAW ON THE INSURANCE EXEMPTION IN THE
VIRGINIAS AND CAROLINAS
North Carolina
Of the four states considered, only North Carolina has a constitu-
tional provision exempting life insurance.7 4 Article X, section 7 of
the 1868 Constitution originally provided that if a husband insures
his own life for the sole use and benefit of his wife and children,
the proceeds payable to them at his death are free from the claims of
his creditors and representatives. In 1931 this provision was expanded
to exempt such a policy from the claims of the husband's creditors
during his life if the insurance is issued for the sole use and benefit
of his wife and children. In addition to the amended constitutional
"See id. at §§ 120-24 for general considerations on exemption of insurance.
7'N.C. Coast. art. X, § 7 (1868).
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provision, there are two statutes exempting insurance, the second
being merely an amendment of the firstJ7
Because of these amendments to both the Constitution and the
statute, it is necessary to consider several different periods in the
development of the life insurance exemption in North Carolina. From
the ratification of the original constitutional provision until 1899,
there was no statute on the matter. The few cases decided during
this time did little more than restate the constitutional rule. Although
the court in Hooker v. Sugg 6 seemed to make its exemption decision
dependent on the constitutional provision, there is language indi-
cating that the same result could have been achieved without aid of
the provision. It was said that the beneficiary's interest in an insurance
policy "vests under the policy at once upon its execution." This
statement accurately sets forth what was probably the prevailing rule
at the time it was made in 1889, the reason for the rule being that most
of the older policies had no provision permitting the change of bene-
ficiaries.77 If the policy gave the beneficiary the immediate and full
interest and reserved no right to the insured, it would seem that
such policy would not be an asset of the insured at any time; and a
statute would not be necessary to place the policy rights beyond the
reach of the insured's creditors.
The second stage of development in North Carolina came with the
passage of the first insurance exemption statute in 1899.78 Its wording
expanded the exemption of the Constitution which protected only
the wife and children and purported to exempt insurance payable to
any person other than the party who effectuated the policy. Although
the statute does purport to expand the class of beneficiaries protected
against the insured's creditors, as yet no case has passed on its con-
stitutionality in this respect.
Other aspects of the relationship between the unamended consti-
tutional provision and the 1899 statute, however, have been ruled on.
In Whiting v. Squires79 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
examined the problem of whether the cash surrender value of a policy
payable to a bankrupt's wife could be reached by a trustee in bank-
N.C. Gen. Stats. §§ 58-205, -206 (1950)-
781o 2 N.C. 115, 119, & S.E. 919 (1889), stated: "The provision in the Constitu-
tion, Article X, Section 7, which authorizes such an insurance for the benefit of the
wife and children, not as yet regulated by statute, clearly looks to a provision to
them, so that they may not be left destitute by the death of an insolvent husband
and father, and is personal to them when they survive."
nVance, Insurance §§ 105-08 (3d ed. ig5i).
(N.C. Sess. Laws 1899, ch. 54, § 59; N.C. Gen. Stats. § 58-205 (1950).
'96 F.2d ioo (4th Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 487 (1925).
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ruptcy when the policy reserved to the insured the power to change
the beneficiaries. In holding the cash surrender value not exempt
during the life of the insured, the court said, "But the exemption
does not embrace the surrender value, the property of the husband,
of a policy in which he can change the beneficiary at will."8 0 It was
further stated that the legislature could not expand the constitutional
exemption. 8 ' Several facts of this case should be remembered as later
developments are considered. 82 First, the insured was living at the
time his creditors proceeded against rights under the policy. Second,
the right proceeded against was the cash surrender value which be-
longed to the insured. Third, the insured had the right to change
beneficiaries. Fourth, the wife was named beneficiary at the time the
creditors took action.
Several years after the decision in Whiting v. Squires both the con-
stitutional provision and the statute were amended in 1931. As previ-
ously stated, the statutory amendment actually took the form of an
independent section3 and made several changes in the then existing
"6 F.2d at 101-02.
""The legislature could not by statute add to the constitutional exemption.
Wharton v. Taylor, 88 N.C. 230. Therefore it could not make an exemption of the
surrender value of the policy which might or might not, according to the will of
the husband, fall to the wife or the wife and children as a policy of which they
were beneficiaries at the death of the husband. It follows that, if the statute be
construed as embracing the surrender value of a policy like these, it would be in-
valid as a legislative attempt to enlarge the insurance exemption of the wife and
children provided by the Constitution." Id. at i02.
"-Chronologically the next significant insurance case is Pearsall v. Blood-
worth, 194 N.C. 628, 140 S.E. 303 (1927), which held that when a husband takes
out a policy with a case surrender value and makes it payable to his estate, but
then exercises his power to change beneficiary and nominate his wife, such a
change is not a transfer in fraud of his creditors even though he is insolvent at
the time the change of beneficiary occurs. At his death the wife is entitled to the
proceeds free from claims of his creditors. The decision is based on a rather
unusual provision of the insurance law (§ 58-205) which provides that when any
married woman receives insurance money, she is entitled to it for "her separate
use and benefit," and if she predeceases her husband, the proceeds shall be for
the separate use of her children. While this "separate use and benefit" provision may
have been intended as an exemption statute, it .clearly goes beyond the pro-
visions of the Constitution in using the words "a married woman," rather than the
term "wife." True, the case did involve the wife of the insured in question, but
the statute relied on by the court seems to create a broader exemption.
In the South Carolina statute, note go infra, it is clearer that the expression
"any married woman" means the wife of the insured.
"3N.C. Gen. Stats. § 58-2o6 (195o): "If a policy of life insurance is effected by
any person on his own life or on another life in favor of a person other than
himself, or, except in cases of transfer with intent to defraud creditors, if a policy
of life insurance is assigned or in any way made payable to any such person, the
lawful beneficiary or assignee thereof, other than the insured or the person so
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law. A few of these changes should be considered. First, it uses the
expression "proceeds and avails," as distinguished from the expres-
sion "proceeds" in the 1899 law, and thus implies that both death
and life benefits are to be protected. It provides that these rights are
protected from the insured's creditors even when he retains the
right to change beneficiaries, or when he is the contingent beneficiary
if the named beneficiary predeceases him. Having thus sought to
protect the policy as a whole to the named beneficiary, the section
finally shows some solicitude for the insured's creditors and permits
them to recover with interest any premiums paid with an intent to de-
fraud creditors. Also, creditors are not precluded from reaching poli-
des assigned in fraud of creditors. As a result of the above statutory
changes in 1931, the present law on the exemption of life insurance
is further complicated; and since 1931 the North Carolina'Supreme
Court has referred to the matter in only two cases. In Commissioner
of Banks v. Yelverton8 4 it was held that the 1931 amendment did not
apply to policies issued prior to the amendment, at least as against
creditors existing at the time of the amendment. It is submitted that
whatever effect the amendment may have on the rights of creditors,
the statute should apply equally to policies issued before or after the
amendment in the case of creditors who became such after 1931.
In Meadows Fertilizer Co. v. Godley s 5 the only other North Caro-
lina decision since 1931 on the insurance exemption, it was held that
when a husband changes beneficiaries and nominates his wife, she,
upon his death, is entitled to the proceeds free from the claims of his
general creditors. Again we have only a quesion concerning death
benefits payable to the wife. Thus on its facts and decision the case
effecting such insurance or the executor or administrator of such insured or of
the person effecting such insurance shall be entitled to its proceeds and avails
against creditors and representatives of the insured and of the person effecting
same, whether or not the right to change the beneficiary is reserved or permitted,
and whether or not the policy is made payable to the person whose life is in-
sured if the beneficiary or assignee shall predecease such person: Provided that
subject to the statute of limitations, the amount of any premiums for said insurance
paid with the intent to defraud creditors, with interlst thereon, shall inure to
their benefit from the proceeds of the policy; but the company issuing the policy
shall be discharged of all liability thereon by payment of its proceeds in ac-
cordance with its terms unless, before such payment, the company shall have
written notice by or in behalf of the creditor, of a claim to recover for transfer
made or premiums paid with intent to defraud creditors, with specifications of the
amount claimed." (Emphasis added.)
"4204 N.C. 441, 168 S.E. 505 (1933).
82o4 N.C. 243, 167 S.E. 816 (1933).
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is not significantly different from the earlier Pearsall8s case and adds
little to one's understanding of the problem.
Regarding the 1931 constitutional amendment which during the
life of the insured exempts policies for the sole benefit of his wife and
children, the principal problem will be in determining what policies
are for their sole benefit. If the amendment was an attempt to alter
the effect of the Squires8 7 decision, then it might be argued that even
when the insured husband has a power to change beneficiaries and the
right to the cash surrender value, still the policy is for the sole bene-
fit of the wife and children until he exercises his rights and thus
divests them of their present right to receive full payment when he
dies. By reading the 1931 statutory amendment and the constitutional
amendment together, there is reason to believe that the legislature
did intend to limit the effect of the Squires case. So far as the con-
stitutional amendment alone is concerned, however, the wording
clearly falls short of overruling Squires. At the same time the statu-
tory amendment seems to be just another unconstitutional attempt,
under the rule laid down in Squires, 8 at expanding the insurance
exemption.
Until the Supreme Court of North Carolina speaks further on
the subject, the law will be highly uncertain. Two rules, however,
can be relied on. First, the wife and children will be protected from
the claims of the husband's creditors both during his life and at his
death if the policy is for their sole benefit. Secondly, in federal bank-
ruptcy cases the trustee will be able to reach the cash surrender value
of policies in which the insured debtor has the power to change bene-
ficiaries.
South Carolina
Since 1875 South Carolina has had a limited life insurance exemp-
tion for the benefit of the insured's wife and children. 89 In 1947 the
prior law was amended to some extent; however, before examining
the present statute, it is helpful to consider the earlier law. Prior to
1947 protection was given to a married woman and her children
by permitting them to take the death proceeds free from the claims of
the husband's creditors if the policy were payable to such beneficiaries
at his death.90 From the wording of the statute it is apparent that
61See note 82 supra for discussion.
wSee note 79 supra,
61See note 81 supra.
8'S.C. Sess. Laws XV, 865 (1875).
0S.C. Code § 7985 (1936).
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the expression "any married woman" was intended to be read as
"wife of the insured."
A limiting proviso in the act stated: "If the premium paid in any
one year out of the property or funds of the husband shall exceed
the sum of five hundred dollars ... such excess... shall inure to the
benefit of such creditors...."91 Under this proviso it was only the
amount of premiums in excess of $5oo and not the portion of in-
surance purchased therewith which was available to creditors.92 Since
the proviso is silent as to whether the premiums to be recoverable
must be paid at a time when the insured was insolvent, it is difficult
to determine whether the intention was to make all premiums in ex-
cess of $5oo per year presumptively fraudulent, or whether it was
meant to say that annual premiums of up to $500 would not be con-
sidered as fraudulent even when paid during a time of insolvency.
93
Two cases, one state and one federal, decided under the pre-1947
statute are of continuing significance. In the case of In re Cunning-
ham94 the question was whether a bankrupt's life policy with a cash
surrender value was exempt from his creditors' claims during his life.
If not so exempt under South Carolina law, the trustee in bankruptcy
would have been entitled to the cash surrender value under the pro-
visions of section 7o(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. The bankrupt in-
sured contended that the policy was exempt because payable to his
wife; it was further contended that this exemption was in addition
to the $50o personal property exemption allowed by the Constitution
of South Carolina. Assuming that the legislature intended the insur-
ance exemption to be effective during the life of the insured, the
District Court examined the constitutionality of the statute. In hold-
ing the cash surrender value available to the trustee in bankruptcy,
the court stated that the statute was an unconstitutional attempt to
expand the exemptions beyond those constitutionally provided.93
In 1936 almost the identical factual situation was presented to the
South Carolina Supreme Court in the Wilson case. 96 The lower court
had held for the wife as against the trustee for the reason that the
PIbid.
9 Harriman Nat'l Bank v. Huiet, a44 Fed. 216 (E.D.S.C. 1916).
IsIbid.
"15 F.2d 7oo (E.DS.C. 1926).
""[S]ection 4o99 of the [South Carolina] Code is in direct conflict with the
[South Carolina] Constitution in that it makes an exemption allowance to husband
and wife of more than $5oo, and is also in conflict with the Constitution in that the
Constitution has occupied the whole domain of exemptions, and the Legislature had
no power to add thereto." Id. at 703. Cf. Whiting v. Squires, note 81 supra.
nVilson v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co., 182 S.C. 131, 188 S.E. 8o3 (1936).
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wife was protected by the insurance exemption even during the in-
sured's life. On appeal the South Carolina Supreme Court avoided
the constitutional issue of whether the insurance exemption act ex-
panded the exemption law of the Constitution. This question was
evaded by a holding that the statute was not intended to apply dur-
ing the insured's life. After a finding that the wife was not protected,
one would expect a reversal of the lower court's decision in her favor.
However, the bankruptcy trustee's appeal was dismissed because he
had relied solely on the constitutional issue which was found to be
irrelevant. Although this is wonderfully painless result-getting, the
lawyer might well wish for a fuller examination of the constitutional
problem.
Turning to the present statute as amended in 1947,07 we find
that the same class of persons, the wife and children, are protected.
Since no change as to when they are protected was made, it must be
assumed that the statute is effective to safeguard them only after
the death of the insured, as was held in the Wilson case.98 The only
real change in the section relates to the amount of insurance which
will be exempt at the husband's death. Under the old law the death
proceeds were exempt except to the extent that the annual premiums
in excess of $5oo had been paid with the husband's assets. The pres-
ent law limits the exemption to $25,000 of life insurance on the life
of the insured. As to the constitutionality of the amended section,
there has been no case. If the Cunningham9 9 decision is still good
law, and there is no reason to believe that it will not be followed by
the federal courts at least, then the new law is also an invalid at-
tempt to expand the constitutionally granted exemptions.
In summary, it appears that the shadow of the Cunningham de-
cision falls across not only the life insurance exemption, but also
across any other legislative exemption greater than those permitted
by the South Carolina Constitution.
Virginia
Several problems concerning the life insurance exemption in Vir-
ginia have been treated by William C. Worthington in a recent
article,100 and for this reason the following will be confined to a
9S.C. Code § 37-169 (1952).
"See note 96 supra.
"See note 94 supra.
"OVorthington, Exemption of the Debtor's Life Insurance in Virginia, 42 Va.
L. Rev. 239 (1956).
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summary of the Virginia situation on the matter. First, it has been
said that Virginia was the last state to adopt a special life insurance
exemption.1 0 ' Since the adoption of the present sections 02 in 1946,
there has been no case and no amendment. Because of these factors
and because the sections are not indexed in the Virginia Code under
the heading "exemptions," it is suspected that their presence is not
widely known. Probably due to their relatively recent origin, the Vir-
ginia provisions are more elaborately phrased than those in other
states considered. This does not mean, though, that complicated ques-
tions will not arise.
It is submitted that the proper construction of the two main Vir-
ginia sections should be as next indicated. First, section 38.1-448 safe-
guards all rights of a third party beneficiary which arise upon the
death of the insured. The exceptions to this general protection of
death benefits are two: (i) the insured's creditors may reach the full
proceeds of policies assigned to third parties in fraud of creditors;
and (2) his creditors may reach death proceeds under a policy pay-
able to a third person to the extent that premiums were paid in fraud
of creditors.
In regard to creditors' rights against life insurance during the life
of the insured, it appears that policies are fully exempt except to
the extent specified in section 38.1-449. This section provides that,
unless the insured is a head of family, creditors of the insured may
claim in full the cash surrender value or loan value of any policy
under which the insured has a power to change beneficiaries. If the
insured debtor is the head of a family, then the cash surrender values
of policies with face values of up to $io,ooo are exempt. For example,
if a head-of-family has three $io,ooo policies with cash surrender
values of $3,000, $4,ooo, and $5,ooo, respectively, his creditors could
reach the cash surrender values of two of these, but one would be
exempt. Apparently the insured debtor would have the choice of
which cash surrender value would be left to him. By these special
provisions of section 38.1-449 Virginia seems to have solved the
troublesome problem of whether or not cash surrender values are
available to the insured's creditors during his life.
As to the constitutionality of the insurance exemption, it has been
predicted that the statutes will be limited to the bounds estabiished
by section 19o of the Virginia Constitution. 03
'Note, 25 Va. L. Rev. 588, 589 (1939).
1 'Va. Code Ann. §§ 39.1-448 to -451 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
2NWorthington, op. cit. supra note xoo, at 255.
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West Virginia
As is true in the other states considered, the West Virginia
statute104 is designed to protect persons other than the insured or the
person effecting the insurince. As to death benefits, there are the
two usual exceptions to the exemption. If the policy is assigned to a
third party beneficiary in fraud of creditors, the exemption does not
apply; and premiums paid in fraud of creditors can be recovered from
the proceeds with interest.
The major problem of whether creditors of the insured may reach
the cash surrender or loan value of the policy has not been passed
on.105 Since there is no specific provision on these lifetime benefits, as
in Virginia, the court will have its choice of protecting the bene-
ficiary, as was done by the Second Circuit in the case of In re Messing-
er, 06 or refusing such protection, as was done by South Carolina in the
Wilson case. 07 Since the West Virginia statute was patterned after the
New York provision involved in the Messinger case, there is reason to
believe that West Virginia will decide in favor of extending protection
to the beneficiary during the life of the insured, even though in one
sense the insured is also being indirectly given an exemption. Such a
holding against the creditors' rights and in favor of the beneficiary
would be in line with a general judicial trend of extending the in-
surance exemption at the expense of creditors regardless of whether
the beneficiary requires the protection and regardless of whether the
insured also has a valuable present interest in the policy. 08
Of the two West Virginia cases decided under the statute, only
one is a life benefit case. In Scruggs v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins.
Co. 09 there is dicta to the effect that the cash surrender value is not
available to creditors during the life of the insured. The actual de-
cision was that a divorced wife claiming alimony out of the cash
surrender value of her husband's life policy payable to their children
could not reach this asset because the equity court had no jurisdiction
over either the policy or the debtor.
0W. Va. Code Ann. § 3397 (Supp. 1959), revising W. Va. Code Ann. § 3359
(1955).
"wThe problem was given some attention in Scruggs v. Jefferson Standard Life
Ins. Co., 125 W. Va. 89, 23 S.E.2d 74 (1942).
02!9 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 279 U.S. 855 (1929).
niSee note 96 supra.
"For a comprehensive discussion of insurance exemption laws in other states,
see Riesenfeld, Life Insurance and Creditors' Remedies in the United States,
4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 583 (1957).
0125 W. Va. 89, 23 S.E.2d 74 (1942).
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VI. LIFE INSURANCE AND BANKRUPTCY
Under the Bankruptcy Act any asset exempt to the debtor under
the laws of his domiciliary state or under the laws of the United
States1 0 is exempt in bankruptcy proceedings."' The exception to
this general rule is that the bankrupt may not claim his exemption
in property recovered by the trustee as a voidable transfer under the
Act. To the extent that life insurance is not exempt under federal
or state laws, it is available to the trustee to a limited extent under
section 7o(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Act.
Despite the awkward wording of this provision, it was intended
to make available to the trustee the cash surrender value of any policy
of life insurance under which such value is payable to the bankrupt,
-his estate, or his personal representatives. Protection is given to the
bankrupt, however, by permitting him to keep the policy if he pays
over to the trustee an amount equal to the cash surrender value."12
Normally a debtor should have little trouble in raising the funds,
since the cash surrender value of the policy could be assigned as se-
curity for a loan to him by the company or any third party. In some
instances the named beneficiaries will have assets available to pay over
to the trustee, thus safeguarding their contingent rights under the
policy.
As shown by the approach taken under the Bankruptcy Act, when
the cash surrender or loan values of a policy are available to the in-
sured, these rights should also be available to his creditors, even
though their seizure by creditors will diminish the named beneficiary's
rights upon the death of the insured. For this reason it is submitted
that it would be an improvement in the law of debtor and creditor
if state statutes were to use the same approach. This has been par-
tially accomplished by the Virginia statutes, 113 which permit loan
and surrender values to be seized by creditors except to a limited ex-
tent when the insured is the head of a family.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
From the present study of the exemption laws in the Virginias
and Carolinas a few conclusions can be drawn. As the real protection
"OUnder the statutes of the United States cash items such as soldier's bonuses,
pension money, and certain retirements are exempt. The presence of these federal
exemptions will have significance not only in the bankruptcy field, but also in
state court proceedings. See Collier, Bankruptcy Manual 6.07 (2d ed. 1954).
2m Bankruptcy Act § 6 (Collier pamphlet ed. 1959).
2"See Collier, Bankruptcy Manual 70.15 (2d ed. 1954).
2uSee note 1o2 supra.
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of the constitutionally granted exemptions has decreased with eco-
nomic and inflationary changes, the number of special exemption
statutes has increased. Despite sporadic additions and amendments
to exemption statutes, it is apparent that little serious thought has
been given to the larger problem of balancing the rights of debtor
and creditor.
The picture of an exemption cornucopia from which flows credi-
tor protection not necessarily related to the needs of the parties pro-
tected should give cause for constructive action to improve our present
exemption laws. Modernization of these laws, however, may be com-
plicated by the presence of constitutional provisions on debtors'
exemptions. The extent to which the courts will restrict the hands
of the legislatures on constitutional grounds has not yet been fully
determined. Surely a challenge is presented.
